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ABSTRACT	
The interaction between discrete components of Internet of 
Things (IoT) and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is 
vital for a collaborative system. The secure and reliable use of 
Cruise Control (CC) with Cloud and Edge Cloud to achieve 
complete autonomy for a vehicle is a key component and a 
major challenge for ITS. This research unravels the 
complications that arise when Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) 
is incorporated into a collaborative environment. It mainly 
answers the question of where to securely compute 
Collaborative Cruise Control’s (CCC) data in a connected 
environment. To address this, the paper initially reviews 
previous research in the domain of Vehicular Cloud, ITS 
architecture, related threat modelling approaches, and secure 
implementations of ACC. An overview application model for 
CCC is developed for performing a threat analysis with the 
purpose of investigating the reasons why a vehicle suffers 
collision. Through the use of interviews, the research analyses 
and suggests the location of computational data by creating a 
taxonomy between the Edge Cloud, Cloud and the On-board 
Unit (OBU) while validating the model. 
Keywords: Collaborative Cruise Control; Connected 
Autonomous Vehicles; Secure Intelligent Transportation 
System; Threat Modelling; Vehicular Cloud Computing;  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IoT is a technological revolution, albeit one at its beginning 
stages which involves collaboration between sensors collecting 
data to predict and suggest a timely action for achieving a task, 
especially in an autonomous vehicle. It utilises the internet 
extensively, supported by Cloud and Edge-Cloud (i.e. fog 
computing) technology. There has been an estimation of 100  
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billion devices that would be connected to the internet by 2025 
[1]. The internet would be a medium, responsible for a large 
amount of data which requires secure and reliable transmission, 
storage, processing and reception of data. Although there are 
various advantages with IoT, it further adds severity to the 
infrastructure if appropriate risk and threat analysis procedures 
are not performed respectively for each application. 
 
ITS utilises the concepts that are involved in the IoT when 
major decisions are to be handled in the Cloud. In the past, 
transportation was the vital connecting power that helped in the 
advancement of technologies. Similarly, the advent of 
communication technologies was another major influential 
force that helped humanity boost its efficiency and capabilities. 
This interdependency between these two fields contributed to 
the development of autonomous technologies for the 
automotive industry. The amalgamation of these two fields of 
technology has given birth to numerous forms of Connected 
Vehicles (CV) programmes across Europe and the US which 
would mainly rely on the significant use of Cloud technologies 
in the near future and opening many gateways and 
opportunities in the domain of IoT [2].  
 
CCC is a vital technology for autonomous driving and ITS and 
it is important to identify the different types of data for CCC 
that can be classified either as in cloud or on-board for 
computation while considering the communication latency, 
security, accuracy and reliability of the data for different 
vehicular applications. To be more specific, this study answers 
the question: Where should we securely compute Collaborative 
Cruise Control data in a Cloud Based Connected Vehicular 
System?  
 
In order to understand which part of the computation an 
application can be offloaded onto the cloud, the application’s 
data should be analysed in an overall manner, their criticality  
understood, a threat analysis  modelled, their risks  examined, 
their respective mitigations  considered and their latency 
requirements be correlated. This paper lays emphasis on CCC 
because it encompasses various applications such as 
longitudinal and lateral speed control and lane changing using 
available communication mediums such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
(V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and direct 
communication to the Cloud using technologies such as IEEE 
  
802.11x, WiMAX, 3G, 4G/ LTE and potentially 5G. Moreover, 
this paper will further set foundations for future work on 
establishing a taxonomy of data by raising questions for CCC 
and other vehicular applications.  
 
In order to achieve this goal, the following four objectives have 
been formulated: Firstly, a review will be conducted on the 
existing research in the domain of vehicular cloud ITS and 
implementations of ACC, Cooperative ACC (CACC) and 
CCC, and the different threat analysis procedures. Secondly, a 
threat analysis is performed after building a conceptual overall 
data flow and on-board model for CCC. Thirdly, the critical 
data is analysed based on the latency, computation, location, 
accuracy and security, and we classify where the data could be 
processed (cloud/on-board) based on the feedbacks received 
from the academics and engineers with automotive and cyber 
security backgrounds. Finally, the accuracy of the developed 
model is verified and the outcomes discussed based on the 
analysis of the critical data. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
carries out the literature review mentioned in first objective. 
Section 3 illustrates a proposed model in detail. Section 4 
highlights the validation process of the model. Finally, Section 
5 concludes the study and describes its findings while raising 
further questions concerning the data computation by providing 
a basis for future work. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK  
 
2.1  Vehicular Cloud 
Vehicles consist of numerous embedded systems such as 
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) which are responsible for 
coordination among many functions in a vehicle such as its 
acceleration, brakes, airbags etc. [3]. These functions do not 
require high computational power compared to data intensive 
applications such as traffic light detection, image recognition, 
and facial and voice recognition, none of which it is efficient to 
implement on the vehicle’s OBU due to the limitations present 
in the computational power on-board [4]. Moreover, there is an 
increase in demand for computationally driven applications [5]. 
This raises a concern about software updates corresponding to 
the hardware components on-board as vehicles have higher 
longevity. These issues can be addressed by offloading the 
vehicles computation to the cloud. Therefore, the cloud 
facilitates the idea of offloading, but it brings along various 
consequences. 
There are two main types of Cloud for vehicles: conventional 
cloud and edge cloud (fog computing). Yan and Xu [6] 
connected the use of cloud computing and IoT in order to 
provide a secure economic platform with two cloud services. 
Using this, a three-layered architecture is developed providing 
an application for intelligent parking cloud service and mining 
vehicular maintenance data. The conventional cloud can be 
classified into three broad categories based on the different 
services they offer: Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS) [4], [6], 
[7]. In addition to this, authors in [8] have also proposed 
deployment models which provide public, community, private 
and hybrid cloud services. These can be inferred from Figure 
1.  
 
According to [6] and [9], edge cloud is an emerging technology 
that is designed to hold dynamic information  which exchanges 
data with the conventional clouds based on the requirements of 
the applications such as services in infotainment, geo-
distribution, location awareness and low latency applications. 
However, this is not the case with conventional clouds as 
interoperability, batch processing, real-time sensing and 
proximity to the vehicle are the limitations that would render it 
unable to cater to the needs of vehicles with latency-sensitivity 
applications. 
 
Similarly, the ITS cloud architecture (Figure 2) consists of 
three abstract layers: cloud layer, communication layer and 
end-user layer showing the use of the conventional clouds and 
edge cloud as previously mentioned [10]. The architecture is 
proposed  for use with correspondence applications such as 
emails, web service applications, cloud backup, business 
applications, research applications and load balancing 
capability but has not addressed the use of computationally 
intensive and safety critical applications. 
 
 
Figure 2: ITS Cloud [10]. 
The implementation of these applications through the use of 
different types of vehicular clouds was explained by [6], [8], 
[10]. However, secure implementation ensuring Confidentiality 
Integrity and Availability (CIA) model was not addressed from 
a security point of view. Moreover, a secure data taxonomy for 
computational offloading related to the above mentioned 
applications was not acknowledged either in the ITS cloud 
architecture or others. On the other hand, the authors did not 
consider authorisation and authentication nor did they consider 
security as a parameter in the theoretical frameworks. In 
addition, trust relationships between the clouds were discussed 
Figure 1: Different Types of Cloud models [8]. 
 
 
 
 
briefly, concluding that there is a vital necessity for a balanced 
security.  
 
Nevertheless, the lack of security measures mentioned above 
are discussed by the authors in [4] and they envisioned the use 
of three different vehicular cloud scenarios. These cloud 
scenarios include Mobile Vehicular Cloud, Mobile Personal 
Cloud, and Mission Oriented Mobile Cloud. Considering these 
cloud environments, the author has raised concerns for privacy 
and security protection, sensing, filtering aggregation of data, 
and secure management of contents based on trust 
management. Moreover, the author has also discussed about the 
use of vehicles sensors for environmental sensing, urban 
surveillance, route management for vehicular traffic 
management. These proposals have raised questions 
concerning how the data can be transferred to the cloud which 
leads us to the Section 2.2. 
 
2.2 Offloading Vehicular Services and Data 
to the Cloud 
Offloading provides a means of migrating the execution of 
computationally and data intensive tasks from OBU to the 
cloud. The authors in [5] have proposed the framework, as 
shown in Figure 3, for the use of cloud computing in vehicles. 
This enables the functions (modules) to decide what kind of 
tasks can be offloaded to the Cloud. This requires consideration 
of different parameters (input and output data size) of the 
application and cost incurred such as latency, network 
downlink, uplink speeds and execution time. Furthermore, they 
proposed a decision making process with the help of model 
execution time ratio (E) which considers offloading of 
applications only if E<1. The proposed framework was 
validated with road experiments by using an Android based 
Mobile device (Nexus 5) and Carnegie Melon University's 
(CMU) private cloud server to verify two applications: on-
board hand gesture recognition and traffic lights and road sign 
recognition. Their experiment, with the use of cloud 
computing, showed a threefold increase in average response 
time compared to the on-board local computation irrespective 
of the vehicle’s speed. 
 
	
Figure 3: Distribution of Application Modules between 
Cloud and OBU [5]. 
Offloading with clouds often has trade-offs in terms of 
communication costs and latencies which could get 
counterbalanced by the efficiency of the computation. The 
author’s work [5] is complemented by work [11] where the 
author proposes an execution prediction mechanism by 
comparing the benefits and efficiency of three different 
application’s computational offloading processes in different 
environments. These applications include face detection, voice 
recognition and DroidFish (an Android alternative of a chess 
engine). However, the authors in [11] designed and illustrated 
the use of IC-Cloud system architecture as shown in Figure 4, 
which introduces the connectivity predictor, a parameter that 
predicts the future connectivity with the help of signal strength 
and historical signal information. 
 
Another significant parameter, the offload controller, relies on 
an execution predictor and a connectivity predictor to decide if 
the task should be offloaded. As a result, the authors proposed 
three ways to reduce uncertainties: lightweight connectivity 
prediction, execution prediction and application trackers. 
These predictions are used in a risk controlled way to offload 
tasks. 
 
The authors in [5] and [11] have both demonstrated  
experimental validations and showed that computational 
offloading and decision making process is possible with the use 
of the mentioned frameworks. The authors in [11] have 
proposed an IC-Cloud architecture. This concept plays an 
important role in influencing the decision making process for 
vehicles. However, both the studies did not consider security as 
a parameter to ensure Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability (CIA) during the offloading process which could 
further add latency due to the extended computation associated 
with encryption or other alternatives. Despite the drawback, the 
demonstrations and experiments play a vital role because 
further research on this concept would provide vehicular 
applications with the ability to offload data to a cloud 
environment in a secure manner. 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview model of IC-Cloud Architecture [11].	
2.3 ITS Architecture 
The ITS architecture shown in Figure 5 consists of six major 
layers of which each layer has its own significance [2], [12]. 
The architecture consists of the application layer, facilities 
layer, networking and transport layer, access layer, 
management layer and security layer. Each layer has its own 
significance, however, the working of each layer is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
  
2.4 Threat Modelling Approaches 
A threat model helps us to understand and identify different 
ways and parameters in which a software application or a 
system architecture can be attacked. It helps a threat analyst 
discover an anomaly with a system or an application in a  
structured manner and then provide questions to address the 
motivations of idealized attackers [13]. It will be useful for 
issues in a systematic manner while understanding the security 
requirements to model better system architectures and models 
for CCC by addressing the issues that other techniques would 
not address. Threat modelling is vital for CCC as it is one of 
the main functions in ITS. It is time and data critical to set the 
vehicle in motion in a synchronous fashion while being aware 
of the environment to ensure safety for the drivers, pedestrians 
and the surrounding vehicles. Streamlining the characters of 
threats to CCC, the system-centric approach is the appropriate 
threat model to use. This is because vehicles coordinate and 
interact as a group of embedded systems which are vulnerable 
and requires a systematic mitigation. The system-centric/asset-
centric approaches can be explained with the help of the 
following four approaches: Microsoft’s threat modelling 
(STRIDE/DREAD) [13], TRIKE [14], OCTAVE [15] and 
Composite Threat Modelling [16]. 
 
The use of STRIDE/DREAD is mainly oriented to software and 
business. However, the applicability of this model is wide and 
flexible enough that it can be used for vehicular systems. 
Alternatively, the author in [14] points out that although the 
benefits are in terms of accountability and integration the major 
drawback of the approach is its lack of the theoretical 
underpinning which thereby makes it unable to support 
academic work. Since the research is a qualitative study on 
CCC systems and its academic nature mainly relies on past 
theoretical works, this makes the methodology difficult to use 
for threat modelling. 
 
TRIKE’s in-depth methodology that involves the use of the 
different models (requirements, implementation, threat, risk) is 
tedious and difficult to alter to the needs of CCC. In addition, 
the tool restricts the use of the methodology as it is not as 
flexible as STRIDE, which any user can understand the 
methodology. Furthermore, TRIKE has a different approach 
where the models, distinct in nature when compared to 
STRIDE, involves a collective approach. Moreover, TRIKE’s 
goals are mainly aligned to meet the needs of a stakeholder 
which is of stark contrast to the objectives of the research. 
Considering these requirement, the study has overlooked 
TRIKE as well and has decided to adopt an alternative 
approach. 
 
Although OCTAVE is one of the approaches suggested by the 
Society of Automotive Engineers in 2016 (SAE), for its stable 
and robust threat analysis on vehicles, this study has not 
adopted the model. This is because the OCTAVE approach is 
mainly applicable for industries and organisations reliant on 
manufacturing vehicles. The approach undergoes an exhaustive 
testing of the developed model during the longitudinal phase of 
testing. Considering this cross-sectional study, it is much more 
inclined towards the use of a composite threat modelling 
approach, due to its simplicity.  
 
Composite threat modelling, from an automotive point of view, 
is built according to the needs of a modern automotive vehicle 
and is an amalgamation of STRIDE/DREAD, TRIKE threat 
modelling and Application Security Framework (ASF) [17].  In 
the Composite model process, as shown in Figure 6, it can be 
observed that each step aligns with the objectives stated in the 
research for classifying the CCC’s data by analysing its 
criticality. In addition, Phase 1 helps in identifying priority 
applications for analysis, which requires a working knowledge 
of a specific component/system and how it relates to other 
components/systems. This is achieved by analysing the 
interconnection diagrams through considering all the data paths 
and potential attacks. By contrast, Phase 2 involves two main 
processes: Threat Identification and Threat analysis. The 
former is a continuous process in which the threats are 
identified from multiple sources such as vulnerability database, 
information sharing from industries etc. The latter involves the 
study of entry points and access methods with the help the of 
use case elements such as STRIDE to create a Vehicle Threat 
Matrix. 
 
3. PROPOSED APPLICATION MODELS 
 
This section provides details of the changes to the proposed 
models discussed in Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 while applying the 
same to the composite threat modelling approach mentioned in 
Section 2.4 due its ease and convenience, and its characteristics 
for vehicles. In addition, it would adapt to identify the reasons 
behind the collision for a vehicle while developing the use case. 
This section is organised based on Figure 6, considering Phase 
1 and Phase 2 respectively. Section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 correlates 
Phase 1 with CCC by applying the modified ITS architecture 
in Figure 7. Phase 2 is discussed in Section 3.4, which 
highlights the threat identification and analysis. 
 
3.1 Modified ITS Architecture  
As Figure 7 illustrates, the ITS architecture is incorporated 
within four key modules to the facilities layer. Based on the 
work of the authors of [5], [11], the proposed ITS architecture 
model uses the concepts connectivity predictor, execution 
predictor, offload controller and online placement framework 
module.  
 
As previously mentioned in Section 2.3, the ITS architecture 
consists of six major layers. The layers that require the 
modification are the application and facilities layer. The 
application layer is catered to by the rest of the five layers. It is 
Figure 5: ITS architecture [2], [12]. 
 
 
 
 
in this layer that the CCC/ CACC module is incorporated as a 
traffic safety application in the modified ITS architecture. 
 
 
 
	
Figure 7: Modified ITS Architecture.	
The facilities layer is mainly responsible for the transmission 
and reception of data and messages. This layer is modified with 
an offloading controller which uses data and information from 
a connectivity predictor and an execution predictor as proposed 
by the authors of [5], [11]. 
 
The offloading controller is responsible for periodically 
profiling the data associated with a module within an 
application that is considered to be safe to be offloaded. For 
offloading to be considered, the data size, network latency and 
execution time are the significant parameters [5]. Since the 
strength of the signal depends on the traffic density and 
interference, the offloading process is dynamic in nature. 
Moreover, the offloading controller is further informed by the 
connectivity predictor and execution predictor. The 
connectivity predictor keeps track of the strength of the signal 
in the form of network states and historic connections. The 
execution predictor accumulates the information from the 
CACC application and then calculates the execution time for 
each of the modules. 
 
Once the offloading controller is informed by the connectivity 
predictor and execution predictor, the online placement 
framework makes dynamic run-time decisions concerning 
which task or module should be offloaded based on the 
Execution Time Ratio, as proposed by authors in [5]. 
 
3.2 Modified CVRIA Overall Flow 
Architecture. 
The Modified ITS Architecture is associated with an OBU of a 
vehicle in Figure 8 and is applied for CCC. The modified 
Connected Vehicle Reference Implementation Architecture 
(CVRIA) gives an overall flow diagram and considers two key 
components: the data centre’s cloud and its edge cloud. This 
proposed advancement functions to distribute the 
computational data for CCC. 
 
The modified CVRIA architecture incorporates the use of cloud 
technology into the data centre and the edge cloud with the 
vehicle. For proper functioning of the CCC there are many 
entities that interact with each other. These entities involved are 
as follows: 
 
3.1.1 Operations Personnel 
These are the people who are stationed at the Traffic 
Management Centre (TMC) who are responsible for control of 
traffic control systems, surveillance systems, incident 
management systems, work zone management systems and 
travel demand management systems. Moreover, they are 
responsible for governing and controlling the Traffic Operator 
inputs to the TMC. These inputs would vary depending on the 
deployment and positon of the job (CVRIA, 2016) [17]. 
 
3.1.2 Traffic Management Centre (TMC) 
The TMC is in charge of controlling and monitoring road 
traffic, road construction and unexpected changes. It is a main 
centre that supervises highway, rural and suburban roads, along 
with managing and informing the traffic in different areas by 
regularly communicating and updating its system using 
Roadside Equipment (RSE) and ITS Roadway equipment. 
 
The TMC receives traffic flow information and environment 
sensed data from the ITS Roadside Equipment while it 
transmits processed traffic sensor and environmental sensor 
control data back to the same source. In addition, the TMC 
sends processed automated lane control data to the RSE after 
receiving the sensed lane status. The RSE also sends the 
relevant traffic situation data along with environmental sensed 
data.  
 
In Figure 8, the TMC is further modified to provide Cloud 
services classified as a Platform as a Service (PAAS) (Section 
2.1) such that it offers a variety of cooperative services and is 
not restricted to only providing traffic information but also 
hazardous location, lane change warning and parking warning 
to the vehicles directly. This is made possible by collecting 
information from both the RSE ITS Roadway Equipment and 
Figure 6: Composite threat modelling approach for 
CCC. 
  
vehicles for further processing and continuous transmission of 
updates to the respective entities. 
 
	
Figure 8: Overall Data Flow Diagram of CCC. 
 
3.1.3 ITS Roadway Equipment 
The ITS Roadway Equipment is present all over the roads and 
functions to sense, monitor, manage and controls the traffic 
along the road. This entity regularly updates the roadside 
equipment and the TMC. It includes many physical devices 
such as [17]: 
• Traffic detectors 
• Sensors that monitor the surroundings such as the weather, 
road condition and the environment. 
• CCTV cameras 
• Traffic signals 
• Video and image processing systems 
• Dynamic message signs 
• Lane automation system 
• Barrier systems that regulates traffic to different roads 
such as tunnels and bridges 
• Work zone systems such as detour ahead signs with zone 
surveillance for traffic monitoring and driver warning 
 
3.1.4 Roadside Equipment (RSE) 
The RSE is in-charge of sending CCC control parameters and 
receiving messages from vehicles such as the vehicle’s 
environmental data, location and motion data, platoon and 
coordination data and CCC status. The transmission and 
reception of messages between vehicles is achieved through 
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) such as IEEE 
802.11p. 
 
The RSE not only supports the functioning of applications for 
vehicles but also communicates with other RSEs along with 
ITS Roadway equipment. It also updates the ITS Roadway 
equipment with entry and exist messages for the relevant 
vehicles, along with traffic situations, which are sent parallel to 
the TMC [18]. 
 
3.1.5 Vehicle OBU 
The vehicle’s OBUs are where all the safety critical functions 
take place after sensing the environment and processing it. This 
is where the ITS architecture is proposed to be instated from 
Section 2.2. The proposed ITS architecture when placed on 
vehicles with its offloading and online placement framework, 
would help transfer computational intensive tasks to the 
distributed components in the environment. These could be 
from neighbouring vehicles, RSEs, or from direct interactions 
with the cloud. The vehicle’s OBU’s provides the vehicle with 
computation, storage, and processing capabilities. The vehicle 
consists of communication technologies for V2V and V2I 
functionalities. 
 
3.1.6 Remote Vehicle’s OBU 
This is the neighbouring vehicle that the host vehicle 
communicates with in order exchange each other’s location and 
motion data along with platoon information. This information 
includes speed, acceleration, position, yaw rate, brakes and 
time. The remote vehicle can be a car, truck, motorbike or even 
a speciality vehicle [18]. 
 
3.1.7 Data Bus 
The vehicle’s data bus such as CAN, LIN, Ethernet/IP, FelxRay 
and MOST are the communication channels present on-board, 
comprising the ITS architecture, to help transmit data to and 
from the ECU governing the physical assets of a vehicle. This 
can be observed further in Figure 9. 
 
3.3 Overall On-board Data Flow Diagram 
for CCC 
The overall on-board data flow diagram of CCC has been 
illustrated in Figure 9. This illustration is important in order to 
perform a threat analysis upon CCC application. 
 
The main components of the CCC are the Radar and Sensor 
systems. These are comprised of Radar based systems (long 
range radar and short/mid-range radar), Ultrasound sensors, 
Camera systems, Lidar systems and GPS systems. The 
workings of these sensors are beyond the scope of this study. 
However, the sensed data from these sensors are pre-processed 
and fused to form a multi-object detection from different 
sensors. Fusion of data is mandatory for overcoming the errors 
from different sensors [18]. These sensors also include the 
wheel sensors, yaw rate sensors and other motion sensors that 
are vital for a vehicle’s movement [19]. 
 
Furthermore, other modules such as the brake control module, 
which depends on the brake actuator and speed sensors for it’s 
source of information, cruise switches, and accelerometer are 
the main inputs to the system which would influence the 
operation of CCC. In addition to this the model has been 
designed to adapt to the collaborative nature of the ITS 
infrastructures by incorporating the modified ITS architecture 
and its external network. The external network, as seen in 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9, comprises of V2V and V2I communication. The 
vehicle also communicates with the data centre which provides 
cloud services. Moreover, the vehicle is in contact with the 
edge cloud, which keeps its source of immediate information  
available. With the help of Figure 9 a threat model can be 
constructed and visualised. 
 
 Figure 9: Overall on-board data flow diagram for CCC 
3.4 Threat Modelling of CCC 
Based on Phase 2 from Figure 6, a threat analysis shown in 
Figure 10 and 11 is performed considering the assets belonging 
to CCC as shown in Figure 9. A description of the assets is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The threat analysis considers 
the asset’s respective inputs, processes and outputs [20]. Using 
this, the threats are modelled to prevent a collision. 
 
One of the ways to achieve this is by maliciously gaining access 
to the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) of a vehicle which can 
enable an adversary to eventually gain complete control of a 
vehicle [3]. Through external communication and in-direct 
access, a vehicle is vulnerable to numerous attacks, as 
illustrated in Figure 11. This could harm the critical operations 
such as acceleration and is therefore riskier to be offloaded. 
Most of the vulnerabilities are present at the software level, as 
stated by the authors in [21]. The critical data for the vehicle 
include it’s velocity, acceleration, GPS coordinates, and the 
vehicle’s sensor data, along with Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII), Vehicle ID, Engine performance and 
diagnostic information. 
 
  
Figure 10: On-board Threat analysis of CCC 
 
 
Figure 11: Threat analysis of CCC based on external 
communication.	
 
4. MODEL VALIDATION 
This study has adopted the use of the semi-structured interview 
as a research instrument for obtaining feedback from 
automotive academics and engineers. It helps gain an 
understanding of the application model from an interviewees’ 
perspective on the data taxonomy of CCC which, when 
compared to the research interpretation, will validate the 
proposed models and interpretations. Moreover, the validity of 
  
the proposed model is derived from the inclusion of 
comparative analysis and the Delphi method. In addition, the 
quality of the model was improved by feedback from experts 
in this domain in two separate rounds.  
 
Table 1. Information of participants 
Partici-
pant 
No. 
Role Experience 
(yrs) 
Interview 
Mode 
P1 Lead Engineer in Automotive 
systems 
4 In-person 
P2 PhD Researcher in Human 
Machine Interface for 
Autonomous Vehicles 
1 In-person 
P3 PhD Researcher in Automotive 
Intrusion Detection System 
1-2 In-person 
P4 Associate Professor in 
Autonomous Vehicles 
5 In-person 
P5 Engineering Doctorate in ITS 1 In-person 
P6 Principle Fellow (Cyber security 
in Vehicles and IoT) 
20 In-person 
P7 PhD researcher in Autonomous 
Vehicles 
5 In-person 
P8 Post-Doctoral Research 
Associate: Vehicular Cloud 
10 Skype 
P9 Reverse Engineer for Vehicles, 
CEO, Network security 
Engineer 
5-6 Skype 
P10 Assistant Professor: 
Experimental automotive 
Engineering 
5 In-person 
 
The participants were chosen based on their experience and 
reputation in the fields of automotive and cyber security. Ten 
participants were chosen for the interviews from the UK and 
other international countries based on their automotive 
experience. In order to maintain anonymity, the participants are 
referred to as P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9 and P10. 
 
Form Figure 12, it can be seen that the analysis was divided 
into 6 steps. Step 1 demonstrates that the interview was 
recorded. Step 2 involves the transcription process where the 
interview was summarized in the form of tabulation. The 
literature reviews in Section 2 are correlated with the 
summaries formed in Step 3. Next, Step 4 combines the 
summaries with the formulated themes. 
	
Figure 12: Flow Chart for Interview Analysis. 
Step 5, as mentioned in Figure 12, is involved in the process of 
comparing and contrasting the different perspectives based on 
themes which help us form conclusions concerning the primary 
data collected for the purpose of validation from the 
participants. Figure 13 illustrates the themes that are formed for 
addressing the research gaps and locating the data storage and 
computation for CCC. The themes are framed in a broader 
perspective from Step 1, in order to understand the opinions of 
Collaborative Vehicles, ITS and Vehicular Cloud, and narrows 
down to Step 10 for data taxonomy. Finally, Step 11 validates 
the model and addresses the issues. 
 
	
Figure 13: Classification of themes for validation of 
Application Model.	
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Different Vehicular Cloud and Edge Cloud implementations 
are identified for the collaborative framework of ITS. Thus the 
ITS architecture is identified but does not consider a secure data 
taxonomy. Next, a critical analysis of threat modelling 
approaches is conducted for vehicles to identify the impact 
caused by harmful data. Overall dataflow of CCC and an 
overall OBU diagram for CCC are created and a threat analysis 
is performed. Based on the results, a discussion is formulated 
for the purpose of creating a data taxonomy for CCC. 
 
According to the research gaps, interviews are conducted to 
gain feedbacks from the experts. With the help of the primary 
data collected, a preliminary analysis is performed to identify 
the critical operations and data for CCC while correlating 
CCC’s overall models. This helped form primary data 
conclusions. Later, an analysis was performed on the literature 
in order to gain an insight into creating a data taxonomy. This 
brought to attention the critical question of who would be 
responsible for the data being computed, if offloaded. 
However, considering the safety-criticality of the function, the 
objective has successfully classified critical data and operations 
such as image and sensor recognition to be computed on-board, 
fundamental value added services such as location oriented 
events to the edge cloud and strategic decisions  such as map 
data to the vehicular cloud. 
 
To achieve this taxonomy, an analysis of the overview models 
was performed and validated with interviews, resulting in the 
proposal of the refined models (Section 3). Therefore, the four 
research objectives are answered by reviewing and gaining 
support from the past literature for creating a model to perform 
a threat analysis and to obtain feedback for the qualitative 
research on the models, thus creating the data taxonomy while 
developing coherent CCC models. Furthermore, this research 
has contributed significantly to CCC in the field of ITS and has 
 
 
 
 
raised a major concern for the standardisation of ITS 
architecture for a further reliable development in the domain, 
in order to integrate automotive manufacturers and 
governments in the development of ITS. 
 
However, trust being a major factor for vehicles to make 
decisions, further research is required to determine the level of 
trust needed for data being transmitted between different 
collaborative entities. This is because an adversary can alter 
any critical data and encrypt it in an authentic manner, before 
transmitting it to the neighbouring vehicles. This has brought 
innovative answers from the participants, some of which 
contribute towards the development of a concept of web-of-
trust among vehicles, or of maintaining trust if the vehicles 
happen to travel in the same road segment and communicate 
with the RSU regularly. In addition, different levels of 
automation require different levels of data administration. 
However, autonomous vehicles require stable communication 
and robust security to monitor and maintain the vehicle as it is 
exposed to numerous acts of human interference. Due to these 
issues, further research is necessary to determine the level of 
security corresponding to different levels of automation. 
 
Finally, ITS is exposed to different types of vehicles, each-with 
different communication capabilities. Because of these issues, 
extensive research is needed in order to determine which 
standards are required to support secure interoperability 
between the ITS technologies among the heterogeneous 
vehicles. Looking at collaborative vehicles from a broader 
perspective, this research has determined the computation of 
CCC’s data. However, further study of how this data can be 
used for different applications and who will hold responsibility 
for the data also needs to be addressed. 
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